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As Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical systems become more ubiquitous and an integral part of our daily lives, it is important
that we are able to trust the data aggregate from such systems. However, the interpretation of trustworthiness is contextual and varies
according to the risk tolerance attitude of the concerned application and varying levels of uncertainty associated with the evidence
upon which trust models act. Hence, the data integrity scoring mechanisms should have provisions to adapt to varying risk attitudes
and uncertainties.
In this paper, we propose a Bayesian inference model and a prospect theoretic framework for data integrity scoring that quantify
the trustworthiness of data collected from IoT devices in the presence of adversaries who manipulate the data. We consider an
imperfect anomaly monitoring mechanism that monitors the data being sent from each device and classifies the outcome as not
compromised, compromised, and cannot be inferred. These outcomes are conceptualized as a multinomial hypothesis of a Bayesian
inference model with three parameters which are then used for calculating a utility value on how reliable the aggregate data is. We
use a prospect theory inspired approach to quantify this data integrity score and evaluate the trustworthiness of the aggregate data
from the IoT framework. Furthermore, we also model the system using the traditionally used expected utility theory and compare
the results with that obtained using prospect theory. As decisions are based on how the data is fused, we propose two measuring
models– one optimistic and another conservative. The proposed framework is validated using extensive simulation experiments. We
show how data integrity scores vary under a variety of system factors like attack intensity and inaccurate detection.
Additional KeyWords and Phrases: IoT; Prospect theory; Expected utility theory; Data integrity; Bayesian framework; Manipulation
attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) is witnessing an exponential growth, both in terms of market value and
number of devices. In situations where multiple devices/networks contend for resources, it is not uncommon that some
will deviate from the mutually-agreed upon norms to either i) illegitimately draw additional benefits or ii) mislead a
central entity (i.e., a hub) from arriving at a fair decision. Thus, there needs to be a mechanism that would establish the
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trustworthiness of the devices [1]. Usually, trustworthiness is assigned to individual IoT devices based on the quality of
information they share with others. However, devices may not always be malicious by themselves but their inputs may
be compromised (e.g., man in the middle attack, replay, etc.) by an adversary before they reach the central decision
maker (performing a fused decision) [2]. In such a case, focusing on a device’s trustworthiness is not appropriate.
Rather, the trustworthiness of the data gathered at the controlling IoT hub is something which is of importance. It may
be noted that an IoT hub may have a generic fusion rule and the final dependability is based on both the type of fusion
rule used and the integrity of the collected data [3].
Furthermore, the anomaly monitoring techniques that are used for gathering evidence on whether an input from a
device is legitimate or not, may not have perfect information. Hence the evidence space for trust modeling is ternary
where each input from a device is either labeled as not compromised (positive evidence), compromised (negative evi-
dence), or cannot determine (uncertain evidence). The question is, can trust models handle uncertainty in an adaptive
manner?
Nonetheless, this problem is further exacerbated, as the adversary’s behavior may not always be consistent and
is dictated by the context of interaction; for example, the adversaries magnitude of attack on a particular time slot,
available power, energy constraints, and the state of other network entities. In other situations, the adversary may
behave honestly for a while to gain confidence and then attack later. Hence an adversary’s behavior is often dynamic,
where they rapidly switch to different modes rendering different behavior under various situations known as On-Off
attacks [4]. In such cases, the regular trust management mechanisms either fail to react quickly or allow quick trust
improvement when the adversary returns to good behavior.
In this paper, we propose a Bayesian and prospect theory based framework for data integrity scoring that signifies
the trustworthiness of the aggregate data gathered at the IoT hub in presence of an adversary. The adversary can
manipulate the data sent to the IoT hub from any IoT device. We assume each IoT device provides a single input on a
time slot, all of which are vulnerable to attacks. We assume a generic but imperfect failure monitoring mechanism that
produces varying feedback over time. We consider that the outcome of the monitoring mechanism can be classified
into three categories: those we know have not been compromised, those we know have been compromised, and those
which cannot be inferred either way. Given these, we compute the trustworthiness of the collected data at the IoT hub
in making a decision. In this regard, we conceptualize the outcome of monitoring the input over time as a multinomial
hypothesis of a Bayesian inference model with three parameters. We build a Bayesian inference-based data integrity
scoring model, where we assign a utility value to reflect the reliability of the collected data. Such an integrity scoring
model also takes into account the risk a system could afford to tolerate. This model can also guide us on what kind
of fusion rule should be used so as to make a robust decision. For example, a mission critical system may not operate
properly even if there are few compromised devices because the associated risks are too high. Therefore, we propose
two models of data integrity measuring– first is an optimistic one and the second is a conservative one. The optimistic
model could be applied to systems where some tolerance for wrong decisions are allowed. However, for a mission
critical system where there is almost no room for erroneous decisions, the conservative model could be used. With
the probabilities of all the outcomes known, we use prospect theory for computing the utilities. Such an approach
helps us model both loss averse and risk averse system, thus allowing us to differentiate between the way the utility is
calculated for optimistic and conservative systems [5]. Then, we compare our model with the more popular expected
utility theory based model and show that that the use of prospect theory is more apt for data that is at risk. We conduct
extensive simulation experiments and show how data integrity scores vary under a variety of system factors like attack
Manuscript submitted to ACM
Prospect Theoretic Approach for Data Integrity in IoT Networks under Manipulation Attacks 3
intensity and inaccurate detection. We observe that with more inputs compromised, the data integrity score reduces.
Low data integrity scores may also be caused by temporal or initial lack of evidence due to uncertainty.
2 RELATED WORK ANDMOTIVATION
Historically, dependability for a particular service has been expressed through trust and reputation scores. Usually,
trust in IoT and other networks is built on evidence provided by a feedback or anomaly monitoring system [6]. The
anomaly monitoring systems usually evaluate whether an input from an IoT device is satisfactory (denoted as 1) or
not (denoted as 0) and expressed as a binary value [7]. However, it is known that itmight not always be possible for the
feedback or anomaly monitoring systems to express interactions from various devices in strict binary values due to
inherent wireless channel uncertainties in wireless IoT networks [8]. In such cases, the feedback system will produce
a ternary evidence, the third inference being ‘undecided’.
Unlike [7], we argue that an IoT device may not be always bemalicious by itself but their inputsmay be compromised
by an adversary before they reach the central IoT hub. In such a case, focusing on an IoT device’s trustworthiness will
not guarantee an assured decision at the IoT hub. For example, a man in the middle attack (MITM) that modifies the
data sent from devices does not represent a compromised IoT device [9].
In a time slotted system, a trust management scheme usually updates individual trust scores over time and is usually
accompanied by a recovery scheme to allow a system to negate effects of intermittent noise or errors. Popular examples
of trust management schemes are cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) or exponentially weighted moving
average (EWMA) [10]. The CWMA provides equal weights to all individual scores and is useful when the goal is to
characterize long term behavior. EWMA, on the other hand, is a forgetting scheme, which provides more weight to
recent observations than old ones to reflect recent changes in conditions. However, both these approaches do not work
well under On-Off attacks when general data integrity scoring is concerned. An On-Off attack is a stealthy distribution
of attacks over the time domain and can be combined with other modification of message attacks [11]. In an On-Off
attack, the modification of message attacks are launched inconsistently over the time to exploit weaknesses in trust
management and redemption schemes. An On-Off attack tries to masquerade attacks as temporary unintentional noisy
conditions. At other times, the adversary’s inconsistent attacks over time may be due to context of interaction. Either
way, we show in Section 6, that CWMA and EWMA do not work when a collective data integrity score (long term) is
required for a system. The expected correctness of data from an IoT cluster or subsystem can be computed. This, in turn,
would lead to design considerations for a highly assured system. Given this, there is a lack of concrete mathematical
framework that quantifies general trustworthiness of collective data where feedback systems do not have perfect or
complete information.
Apart from the necessity of proposing a concrete mathematical framework for capturing a posterior belief about
trustworthiness of future data sent from each device in an IoT network, there is a need for another mathematical model
to aggregate the data from the different devices and make a fair decision about reliability of the aggregated data [12].
This model should be flexible enough to make a reasonable decision for different systems with different thresholds of
tolerance for adversaries– these features are addressed by models based on prospect theory.
Prospect theory has been shown to be the most appropriate theory for decision making under risk for economical
problems [13]. It also models how people behave in risky situations more accurately than expected utility theory [14].
As we will discuss in this paper, the data fusion center in an IoT network will have a similar behavior towards adver-
saries. Formerly, Prospect theory has been used to model continuous, stealthy attacks on cloud storage devices. In [15],
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L. Xiao et al. have claimed that prospect theory can model these kinds of attacks more accurately than expected utility
theory since these attacks have a similar behaviour as human beings.
Furthermore, prospect theory has been applied to analyze wireless communications and traffic routing [16–18].
In [16], a random access game is formulated using prospect theory to study channel access between two subjective
end-users in wireless networks. In [17], Y. Yang et al. have proposed to use prospect theory for resource allocation in
cognitive radio networks and pricing which increases the revenue of service providers in presence of subjective users.
The suitability of prospect theory for routing decisions in a stochastic network is investigated in [18]. S. Gao et al. have
modeled the routing decison using both prospect theory and expected utility theory. They prove that prospect theory
is a more apt model using empirical results because of its inherit features such as risk aversion an loss aversion.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a time-slotted system comprising N IoT devices each of which provides only one input (i.e., the vote) on
each time slot. The nature of the decision is generic; it could be as simple as a binary voting or it could be some complex
decision metric. A centralized IoT hub fuses all votes from each component through a fusion scheme (e.g., majority or
plurality voting rule) to arrive at a global decision.
•Adversarial model:We assume that all the inputs from each IoT device are exposed to an adversary whose goal is
to disrupt the voting process at the central hub. The adversary has some predefined attack resources and can choose
to attack different sets of inputs over time and also attack varying number of inputs in each time slot. However, it
maintains a long term average of the fraction of the inputs it attacks which we call the probability of attack and denote
as Pa . For example, Pa = 0.6 means that the adversary compromises 60% of the inputs over a large period of time.
Hence a single observation (over one time slot) is not sufficient for characterizing the behavior of the adversary.
•Imperfect failure monitoring: We assume that there is a failure monitoring or anomaly detection mechanism in
place that infers whether the input from each device has been compromised or not. Unlike related works [7, 19], we
consider that the monitoring mechanism cannot infer an anomaly with certainty. Thus, it classifies the inputs into
three categories: i) compromised, ii) not compromised, and iii) undecided. All three are functions of environmental
parameters that may be dynamic over time. Also system transients and noisy environments may increase or decrease
temporal uncertainty. Hence, the data integrity is computed over time– a larger time window of observation allows a
more accurate estimation of the overall data integrity.
•Uniformly distributed prior inference: Since there is no bias (or available information) over any of the three
possible outcomes of the monitoring process, we assume that the initial probabilities of each is equal. Similarly, we
assume that the prior probabilities of an input being compromised or not is also uniformly distributed.
•Probability of detection: We define the probability of detection as the percentage of IoTs’ inputs that can be ac-
curately inferred as compromised or not compromised and denote it as Pdetect . Let us further illustrate the meaning
of Pdetect using Fig. 1 that shows an input in reality could be either compromised or not compromised. If compro-
mised, it can be inferred as either as ‘compromised’ with a probability a1 (correct) or ‘undecided’ with probability a2
(uncertain) or ‘not compromised’ with a probability a3 (missed detection). Similarly, if an input was not compromised,
it can be inferred as either ‘not compromised’ with a probability b1 (correct) or ‘undecided’ with probability b2 or
‘compromised with a probability b3 (false alarm). Thus, for the two real cases, detection occurs with probabilities a1
and b1. If an input has equal chances of being compromised and not compromised, then Pdetect =
a1+b1
2 . Else, a1
and b1 will have to be weighted with their corresponding probabilities. For all practical purposes, we consider Pdetect
to be at least 0.5, since it is impractical to have a monitoring mechanism where majority of feedbacks are incorrect.
Manuscript submitted to ACM
Prospect Theoretic Approach for Data Integrity in IoT Networks under Manipulation Attacks 5
Similarly, Puncer tain =
a2+b2
2 denote the probabilities of ignorance (expressing inherent uncertainty) about IoT in-
puts. Per ror =
a3+b3
2 denotes probability of errors made by the feedback system. These probabilities are used for
performance evaluation.
a2
a1
a3
b1
b2
b3
Compromised
Not compromised
Real
Component
Monitored
Compromised
Undecided
Not compromised
Fig. 1. Inference possibilities for detection probability
The above features make the problem of computing the data integrity a probabilistic concept. Hence, we compute
the utility value as an incremental process based on observations over time slots. If the adversary uses the same attack
strategy, then the utility value will converge sooner. On the other hand, if the adversary changes its attack strategy
(i.e., dynamic attack strategy), the utility value will oscillate even for large time windows. Later, we study a special case
on how the proposed theoretical model can be modified to accommodate adversaries that do not have a fixed Pa and
launch a dynamic (e.g., On-Off) attack strategy.
On-OffAttack:The On-Off attack strategy is denoted with an Off:On ratio. In ‘Off’ stage the adversary does not attack.
In ‘On’ stage the attacker manipulates a random number of inputs on each time slot. It may be noted that ratios with
equal Off to On stages do not depict true inconsistency. Higher ratios like 2:1 and 3:1 are used in this paper. Remember
that very high Off:On ratio hardly means the adversary behaves honest most of the time hence may not be realistic.
4 DATA BASED DECISION MAKING
Let the three outputs of the anomaly monitoring mechanism, viz. ‘not compromised’, ‘compromised’, or ‘undecided’
be denoted by α , β and µ respectively. Let nα represent the number of device inputs that have ‘not’ been compromised,
nβ be the number of compromised ones, and nµ be the number for which a decision could not be arrived. Of course,
nα + nβ + nµ = N . Since the values of nα , nβ and nµ change over time, we represent these observations at time t as
nα (t), nβ (t) and nµ (t).
Given that the underlying parameters of the system supplying accurate data are unknown, we use a Bayesian
inference approach to incrementally update the corresponding probability estimate for a hypothesis that the data
aggregate is correct with a certain probability. The system is only as reliable as the individual inputs are. Therefore,
we have to calculate the posterior probabilities associated with encountering each of the three feedbacks. The final
data integrity score will be some function of these posterior probabilities which are also known as belief estimate in
Bayesian inference.
To begin with, an uniform belief over the three possibilities is assumed as there is no initial information. As time
progresses, we update the belief estimate based on the observed values of α , β , and µ which increases the accuracy of
the estimate of the belief associated with each category.
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We define θα , θβ , and θµ as the probabilities for an input being ‘not compromised, ‘compromised’, and ‘undecided’
respectively. Of course, θα + θβ + θµ = 1, since the outcomes are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. We define X (θ¯ )
as the hypothesis described by these underlying unknown Bayesian probability parameters where θ¯ = {θα , θβ ,θµ }.
LetDα ,Dβ , andDµ represent the random variables that represent the number of times the outcomesα , β and µ occur.
The observation data can be represented as random observation vector D(N ) = {Dα , Dβ , Dµ } having a multinomial
distribution also known as concentration hyperparameter of the underlying 3-tuple probability parameter described by
θα , θβ , and θµ . The commonly used notations are tabulated in Table 1.
Table 1. Notations
Symbol Meaning
α , β , µ Not compromised, compromised or undecided events
nα Number of inputs detected as ‘not compromised’
nβ , nµ No. of inputs det. as ‘compromised’ and ‘undecided’
N Total number of voting components
θα ,θβ , θµ Unknown probability for observing event α , β , µ
θ¯ Bayesian probability parameters of the three events
X (θ¯ ) Hypothesis of a event
Xˆ (θ¯ ) Posterior hypothesis or belief
D(N ) Random vector denoting data hyperparameter
Pdetect Probability of accurate detection
Rα , Rβ , Rµ Posterior Bayesian belief of the three events
cn , cc , cu Not compromised, compromised or undecided costs
c Average cost of decision making for each component
π Profit Function
πP Profit Function at the Reference Point
δ Deviation from Reference Point
V Value Function
W Weighting Function
4.1 Bayesian Inference
As mentioned earlier, there are N independently monitored components of a system whose parameters for voting
behavior are unknown due to changing adversarial attack strategies and the imperfect monitoring mechanism. Given
this, we calculate the Bayesian belief associated with ‘not compromised’. Similarly, we will model Bayesian posterior
belief for the other two cases as well viz. compromised and undecided.
We use the observation counts from the sequential observations over time to calculate the posterior Bayesian esti-
mate of each of the parameters. Our objective is to estimate and update the probability parameters in X (θ¯ ), viz. θα , θβ ,
and θµ based on observation evidence D(N ) and prior information on the hypothesis parameter, θ¯ , itself.
Since there is no information about θ¯ initially, we consider the prior parameters of θ¯ to be uniformly distributed.
Subsequent observations decide how these parameters are updated. Our first step is to calculate the Bayesian estimate
of θ¯ .
First, we show the case of estimating belief that a ‘not compromised’ occurs (θα ). Since in Bayesian inference, the
assumption is that prior and posterior probability have the same distribution, we can formally define the probability
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parameters as:
P(X (θ¯ ) = α |θ¯ ) = θα
P(X (θ¯ ) = β |θ¯ ) = θβ
P(X (θ¯ )) = µ |θ¯ ) = θµ
(1)
This assumption is due to the well known fact that a Dirichlet distribution acts as a conjugate prior to multinomial
distributions [20]. Hence prior and posterior preserve the same form.
The observations data D(N ) can be treated as a multinomial distribution with probability parameter θα , θβ , and θµ,
where the probability mass function is given by:
P(Dα = nα ,Dβ = nβ ,Dµ = nµ |θ¯ ) = P(D(N )|θ¯ ) =
N !
nα !nβ !nµ !
θ
nα
α θ
nβ
β
θ
nµ
µ (2)
Given this we can use Bayes theorem to calculate the posterior belief estimate on the event of a positive interaction
Xˆ (θ¯ ) = α , given observation data D(N ) as:
P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) = α |D(N )) =
P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) = α ,D(N ))
P(D(N ))
(3)
The denominator of the above equation is the marginal probability that can be conditioned or marginalized on all
possible outcomes for θ¯ and since probabilities are continuous
P(D(N )) =
∫
D(N )(θ¯ )
P(D(N )|θ¯ )f (θ¯ )d(θ¯ ) (4)
Since there is no prior information on θ¯ (before any observations) in Eqn. (4), we can assume it to be uniformly
distributed such that f (θ¯ ) = 1 and we can put Eqn. (2) in Eqn. (4), and get
P(D(N )) =
N !
nα !nβ !nµ !
∫
D(N )(θα ,θβ ,θµ )
θ
nα
α θ
nβ
β
θ
nµ
µ dθαdθβdθµ (5)
P(D(N )) =
N !
(N + 2)!
(6)
Assuming conditional independence between the Xˆ (θ¯ ),D(N ) and θ¯ , we calculate the numerator of Eqn. (3), P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) =
α ,D(N )), as:
P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) = α ,D(N )) =
N !(nα + 1)
(N + 3)!
(7)
Thus, Eqn. (3), can be solved by dividing Eqn. (7) by Eqn. (6), which gives
P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) = α |D(N )) =
nα + 1
N + 3
(8)
Similarly, P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) = β |D(N )) =
nβ+1
N+3 and P(Xˆ (θ¯ ) = µ |D(N )) =
nµ+1
N+3 . These equations are the expressions for
posterior belief of ‘not compromised’, ‘compromised’, and ‘undecided’. To simplify the notations of belief estimates of
the three categories, we rewrite them as Rα , Rβ , Rµ respectively. Of course, it can be verified that Rα + Rβ + Rµ = 1.
5 DATA INTEGRITY UNDER UNIFORM ATTACKS
In this section, we propose two system models under different conditions. Then, we propound a data integrity mea-
surement approach based on prospect theory.
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5.1 Optimistic System Model
As was discussed, there are three possible outcomes for each of the components of IoT framework in each time slot:
compromised, not compromised, and undecided. Each of these outcomes will incur some costs. As it is evident, the
compromised components will effectuate the highest cost, denoted by cc . Not compromised devices will also cause
some cost denoted by cn . The third cost, denoted by cu , is associated with the devices that remained undecided. Based
on the system requirement, we will take different measures for undecided components. The general relation between
these costs is:
cn < cu ≤ cc (9)
For optimistic systems, we consider half of the undecided components as compromised because we assumed that
adversary has uniformly chosen the IoT inputs to attack i.e., there is no reason for preferential attack on a certain IoT
device’s input. In this case cu is defined as follows:
cu =
cc + cn
2
(10)
Of course, when the proportion of undecided is high, we may not be as confident on the integrity measurement than
when we have fewer undecided.
5.2 Conservative System Model
Unlike the optimistic approach, where the undecided ones are split in an equal ratio, the conservative model treats the
undecided ones as if they aremore likely to be compromised. In this case, we consider twoweights for the compromised
and not compromised costs namely w1 andw2 in a way thatw1 +w2 = 1 and 0.5 < w2 ≤ 1. Hence,
cu = w1cn +w2cc (11)
This conservative way of computing the undecided cost is more appropriate for mission-critical systems where the
decisions can mostly be made based on the ‘not compromised’ inputs. Depending on how conservative a system is,
we define the weight w2 . By increasing w2, the chance of assuming a compromised device as a not compromised one
reduces. If the system is highly mission-critical and there is no room for risk, we consider w2 = 1. In this case, all
undecided devices are considered as compromised even if there could be some that were not compromised.
5.3 Data Integrity Using Prospect Theory (PT)
Using the Bayesian posterior believes of the three possible outcomes (as obtained in section IV), we want to calculate
a utility value based on prospect theory (PT). This utility value is obtained as follows:
Utility =
3∑
i=1
V (δi )W (Pi ) = V (δα )W (Rα ) +V (δβ )W (Rβ ) +V (δµ )W (Rµ ) (12)
where V denotes value function andW denotes weighting function. δα , δβ , and δµ are three deviation values related
to the three independent outcomes of extracted data from each device in an IoT network. These deviations show the
difference between profit function, denoted by π , and reference point denoted by πP . Due to the independence of the
outcomes, three different profit functions are defined for each and are denoted by πα , πβ , and πµ . The deviation values
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and profit functions are defined as follows:
δα = πα − πp ; πα = Nc − nαcn
δβ = πβ − πp ; πβ = Nc − nβcc
δµ = πµ − πp ; πµ = Nc − nµcu
(13)
We need to define another variable called the ‘reference point’ to calculate deviation values. πP is defined by assum-
ing all the IoT devices as not compromised:
πp = N (c − cn ) (14)
According to Eqns. (13) and (14), the statewhich is considered for all then nodes at the reference point will determine
whether the real outcomes are gains or losses. By considering all the n nodes as not compromised at the reference point,
any node which is not compromised will always be considered as a gain and other outcomes will be counted as a gain
or loss based on the cost values. However, if we had considered the nodes as compromised or undecided at the reference
point, the value of δ in each state would increase such that even compromised devices yield a gain. The reason for the
gain is that the not compromised devices have the lowest cost.
As for the value function, it is an asymmetrical S-shaped function as shown in Fig. 2. It is asymmetric because of
its loss aversion nature which causes the same absolute values to have more impact for the loss than the impact on
gain. Its value is dependent on the deviation of the profit values from the reference point, defined in Eqn. (13). Value
function is obtained as follows:
V (δ ) =
{
δγ if δ ≥ 0;
−λ(−δ )γ if δ < 0
(15)
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
x
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
V(x
) λ  = 1,    γ = 1;  EUT
λ  = 1,    γ = 0.2
λ  = 2.5, γ = 0.2
λ  = 2.5, γ = 0.5
Fig. 2. Examples of value function with different λ and γ
Positive part of the value function represents the gain and its negative section denotes the loss in reliability of the
integrated data from the IoT devices. λ and γ are two parameters used for controlling loss aversion and risk aversion
where λ > 1, and 0 < γ < 1 [21]. By increasing λ, the IoT system will become more loss averse and consequently will
become more asymmetric with the loss part becoming more convex. By decreasing parameter γ , the IoT system will
become more risk averse. The effect of these parameters in value function is shown in Fig. 2. Choosing the right values
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for these two parameters depends on the IoT system. As the system becomes more conservative, it becomes more loss
averse.
According to Eqn. (12), we need to define another function called weighting function. Based on prospect theory (PT),
in real life decision making process, people overreact to lower probabilities and under-react to higher probabilities [22].
Here, we have the same situation. For example, if one device is compromised, it will have a significant impact in
reliability of the aggregated data. However, if we have 30 devices and 20 of them are compromised, having one more
compromised device will not bring about a significant difference. Furthermore, the effect of probability weights is
not the same for loss and gain [23]. As it is obvious, it is desirable to have the minimum possible loss rather than
achieving a huge gain since even a little loss will result in losing confidence in the aggregated data. Therefore, two
similar weighting functions but with two different parameters, denoted by ω and ρ, are defined for gain denoted by
W +(p) and loss denoted byW −(p) as follows:
W +(p) =
pρ
[pρ+(1−p)ρ ]
1
ρ
0.5 ≤ ρ < 1
W −(p) =
pω
[pω+(1−p)ω ]
1
ω
0.5 ≤ ω < 1
(16)
ρ and ω are defined in a way to emphasize loss which means choosing lower values for ω in comparison with ρ.
Their values also depend on the system that we are dealing with. In conservative systems, the effect of weighting
function for loss will be higher than optimistic systems. Therefore, conservative systems have lower values of ω in
order to cause strict penalty for loss. On the other hand, the value of ρ for conservative systems is higher than the
optimistic ones since achieving gain in conservative systems is not as highly valued as in optimistic systems. In other
words, achieving gain in a conservative system will not achieve a positive utility as high as its optimistic counterpart.
The effects of these two parameters are demonstrated in Fig. 3.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
p
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
W(
p)
ω = ρ = 1
ω = 0.63
ρ = 0.69
ω = 0.71
ρ = 0.79
Fig. 3. Effect of ρ and ω on weighting function. P corresponds to the posterior belief of the 3 possible outcomes
Using these definitions, we obtain a utility value for an IoT system in each time slot. This utility value indicates the
aggregated data from all the nodes in this IoT framework is reliable to what extent. Each IoT network will have its own
parameters. Based on these parameters, a threshold is defined for the utility value of each IoT system. If the calculated
utility of this system is higher than this threshold, the aggregated data from this system has acceptable integrity.
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5.4 Data Integrity Using Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
Though we argue for an prospect theoretic approach for preserving data integrity in IoT networks, there are other
competing theories and one of the most popular ones is the expected utility theory (EUT) [24]. However, the utility
derived from EUT is not as risk averse and loss averse as that obtained by prospect theory [25]. Therefore, it is expected
that it does not significantly differentiate between optimistic systems and conservative systems.
When we compare PT with EUT, we should analyze two functions: value function and weight function, which are
shown accordingly in Figs. 2 and 3. In this problem, we are dealing with three possible outcomes. According to Eqn. 12,
the final utility is the summation of the utilities of these three outcomes. Therefore, we should analyze the effect of
these two functions on each of these three utilities separately.
5.4.1 Small aack magnitudes. By taking into account the mentioned features, for small attack magnitudes, it is ex-
pected that compromised and undecided devices will incur more negative utility values for PT than EUT. In addition,
these devices will have higher weights for PT than EUT. On the other hand, non compromised devices which have
higher probabilities will have higher positive utility value in PT than EUT. However, their weight in PT is less than
EUT. By considering all of these facts, it is expected for small attack magnitudes, the total utility value which is a
positive value is higher for EUT.
5.4.2 Moderate aack magnitudes. However, for moderate attack magnitudes, the weights for PT and EUT are almost
the same and the only difference is in the utility values. According to Fig. 2, the positive utility for PT and EUT are
not significantly different. However, the negative part is noticeably different. Therefore, the positive utility incurred
by non compromised devices is almost the same for PT and EUT but the absolute value of negative part of PT which
is caused by compromised and undecided devices is more than EUT. In conclusion, for moderate attack magnitudes, it
is expected that the absolute utility value of PT is higher than that of EUT.
5.4.3 Large aack magnitudes. For large attack magnitudes, again the positive part is almost the same for PT and EUT.
However, for the negative part which is caused mostly by compromised devices, the story is different. As mentioned
earlier, PT is risk seeking in the loss domain. It means that for large negative values of x in value function, the absolute
utility value of EUT is larger than PT. Therefore, the magnitude of negative utility value incurred by compromised
devices in EUT is more than PT. In addition, the negative utility values caused by compromised devices have higher
weights in EUT. Therefore, it is expected that EUT will have higher absolute value than PT for large attack magnitudes.
5.4.4 Conservative systems vs optimistic systems. Disregarding the under-reaction for larger probabilities in expected
utility theory is more noticeable for conservative systems which have higher costs for malicious nodes. It means that
since the expected utility does not utilize a weight function, the effect of the probabilities for large probabilities in EUT
is more than that of PT. Thus, the absolute utility value of EUT is larger than PT. The effect of this phenomenon is
to the extent that for high attack magnitudes, utility value using EUT for optimistic systems is lower than the utility
value using PT for conservative systems.
6 ASYMMETRIC TRUST UPDATE FOR ON-OFF ATTACKS
In On-Off attacks, the adversaries have preferences over time periods where an adversary may choose not to attack for
some time (Off) and then attack for some time with a random magnitude (On). In such a case, both CWMA or EWMA
would not reflect true behavior of the node. The equal weighted CWMA will lag in reflecting such attacks, while
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EWMA will enable the system to quickly recover or redeem its reputation when it switches back to honest behavior.
Under On-Off attacks, the data integrity scoring framework should not allow the system to recover its integrity score
even though the adversary starts behaving well after a short burst of attack. In Fig. 4, we show an example where the
adversary employs a 2:1 Off-On ratio where it divides the time domain of 300 slots in four stages; ‘Stage 1’ ranging
from t = 0 − 100, ‘Stage 2’ ranging from t = 101 − 150, ‘Stage 3’ ranging from t = 151 − 250, ‘Stage 4’ ranging from
t = 251 − 300. Finally ‘Stage 5’ ranging from t = 301 − 500 is a no attack phase to analyze the after effects of On-Off
attacks. In Stage 1, the adversary does not attack in a bid to gain a high trust of the system initially. In Stage 2, it
attacks for the next 50 time slots with a random magnitude on each of the time slots. In Stage 3, it does not attack
on any of the 100 slots. In Stage 4, it again attacks on 50 slots with a random attack magnitude. In Stage 5, it again
behaves cooperatively. Suppose an algorithm checks whether the system is compromised or not every 50 slots and
uses a threshold of zero below which the collective should be considered ‘unusable’ for decision making. On 100-th,
200-th, 250-th, 350-th, 400-th, 450-th and 500-th slot, the system’s data is deemed usable by both trust/score update
schemes although adversary is employing a stealthy On-Off attack. We see that CWMA reacts too slowly and fails
to reflect malicious nature even at the end of the Stage 2. On the other hand, EWMA detects attacks quickly but also
allows such nodes to quickly recover their reputation on 151-th and 301-th slot in the ensuing Off period. Hence there
is need for a special trust update scheme that would restrict the average data integrity to improve quickly even when
the adversary starts behaving cooperatively after malicious activity as well as be responsive enough to decrease the
integrity score when a adversary starts acting maliciously after building a high reputation.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time Slot
W
eig
hte
d I
nte
gri
ty 
Sc
ore
 
 
Exponential (EWMA)
Cumulative (CWMA)
Allows Quick Recovery
Too Slow to React
Stage 5: NO Attack
   t = 300 − 500
Stage 4: Attack
   t =  251−300
Stage 3: NO Attack
      t = 151 − 250
Stage 2: Attack
    t = 101 − 150
Stage 1: NO Attack
      t = 0 − 100
Fig. 4. Shortcomings of CWMA and EWMA
6.1 Weighted Integrity Score
Let us denote the utility of data integrity as obtained from Eqn. 12 as udi . Since the interval ofudi is large, the depiction
of trust values and bounded classification decisions as dependable or not get difficult. Hence, we map these scores to
a bounded lower dimensional plane via a scaling trick, which ensures all negative udi values are mapped between
[-1,0] and positive udi values are mapped between [0,+1]. Also, the weights monotonically increase with increasing
data integrity and vice-versa. Therefore, we report the normalized weightwdi by giving a value between [−1, 1] using
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Eqn. (17). The normalized weighted integrity score is given by:
wdi =

1 − e−|udi | if udi > 0;
−(1 − e−|udi |) if udi < 0;
0 if udi = 0
(17)
The above equation which uses trust to give weights helps to clearly distinguish between two classes of nodes. At any
time t , the weighted integrity score is denoted aswdi (t).
6.2 Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average scheme
We propose an Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) technique that is based on the socially inspired con-
cept that bad actions are far more remembered than good actions. This forms the basis of the asymmetric weighted
moving average scheme, where slots with instantaneous integrity trust wdi (t) lower than a threshold Γon−of f are
given more weight than time slots where wdi (t) has higher values. The value of Γon−of f is dictated by a system spe-
cific risk attitude and defines what can be termed as sufficiently good behavior. In the update of trust values, there are
two important things; the cumulative average and current trust value. We introduce four weighting factors χa , χbmax ,
χcmin and χd such that 0 < χa < 1; 0 << χbmax < 1; 0 < χcmin << 1 and 0 < χd < 1. Note the fact that χcmin is
much much less than χbmax introduces an asymmetry. Now there may be four possible scenarios at time t with regard
to On-Off attacks.
Case (a):w
mavд
di
(t − 1) > Γon−of f andwdi (t) > Γon−of f
Case (b):w
mavд
di
(t − 1) > Γon−of f andwdi (t) ≤ Γon−of f
Case (c):w
mavд
di
(t − 1) ≤ Γon−of f andwdi (t) > Γon−of f
Case (d):w
mavд
di
(t − 1) ≤ Γon−of f andwdi (t) ≤ Γon−of f
In Case (a), a cumulative average higher than Γon−of f suggests a system is maintaining a sufficiently good behavior.
If the current trust value is also higher than Γon−of f then it suggests continuity of the good behavior. Hence continuing
good behavior is rewarded with a high weighting factor χa towdi (t) and low weightage given tow
mavд
di
(t − 1) using
1 − χa . We name χa as a rewarding factor such that 1 > χa > 0. It helps a historically reliable system to improve, or
at-least maintain its reputation, if it also behaved in a cooperative manner in time slot t . Hence for Case (a), cumulative
trust is updated as:
w
mavд
di
(t) = (1 − χa ) ×w
mavд
di
(t − 1) + χa ×wdi (t)
In Case (b), a cumulative average higher than Γon−of f and wdi (t) ≤ Γon−of f suggests a system maintaining a
sufficiently good behavior upto time t − 1 and then initiated some anomalous behavior. Hence all the good behavior
until now needs to be forgotten and a very high weight be given to the current slot’s anomalous behavior. This will
cause the system’s cumulative trust value to quickly decrease. Once this happens, Case (c) would ensure that the
cumulative trust is not able to redeem itself quickly. Hence wdi (t) is weighted with a high value χbmax such that
1 > χbmax >> 0 and w
mavд(t−1)
di
is weighted using 1 − χbmax . We name χbmax as a punishment factor. The higher
the value of punishment factor the quicker the drop in the reputation and hence the more severe the system’s reaction
will be to new evidence of malicious behavior. In such cases, the cumulative trust is updated as:
w
mavд
di
(t) = (1 − χbmax ) ×w
mavд
di
(t − 1) + χbmax ×wdi (t)
Manuscript submitted to ACM
14 Salimitari et al.
In Case (c), a cumulative average lower than Γon−of f but a current trust valuewdi (t) higher than Γon−of f signifies
a system where current inputs are cooperative but has a history of anomalous behavior which may be as recent as
t − 1. Hence even though wdi (t) may be high we assign it a very low weight χcmin such that 0 < χcmin << 1 and
assign 1 − χcmin tow
mavд(t−1)
di
. We name χcmin as the redemption factor that controls how fast or slow a system with
malicious history can redeem its trustworthiness if it shows good behavior for a sufficiently long time. Redemption
factors also make it possible for systems which experienced noise redeem their trust values. A low redemption factor
ensures that the trust value is not increased quickly even though a system starts to behave honestly after a period of
malicious behavior. In this case cumulative trust is updated as:
w
mavд
di
(t) = (1 − χcmin ) ×w
mavд
di
(t − 1) + χcmin ×wdi (t)
In Case (d), both cumulative average and current trust value of node j are below Γon−of f indicating continuing
anomalous behavior. In such a case, we provide χd known as retrogression factor as weight to the current value and
1 − χd weight to cumulative average such that trust is updated as:
w
mavд
di
(t) = (1 − χd ) ×w
mavд
di
(t − 1) + χd ×wdi (t)
The above scheme, termed as asymmetric weighted moving average, is effective in defending against On-Off attacks
which is not possible using equally weighted or exponential weighted moving averages. In the simulation section, we
also show that this can also be effective to distinguish malicious IoT devices and devices experiencing intermittent
noise.
7 SIMULATION MODEL AND RESULTS
We simulate a generic system with 100 IoT devices. Inputs from all devices are monitored by an imperfect monitoring
mechanism that produces three possible outcomes. The probability of detection and attack are varied to capture their
effects on data integrity measurements.
Under non-opportunistic attacks, an adversary attacks and compromises different sets of inputs over time. The
number of inputs compromised vary over each time slot; although the long-term average of the number of inputs
compromised, denoted by Pa , remains the same. Under opportunistic On-Off attacks, we study how a system can
establish appropriate trustworthiness under opportunistic time dependent attacks. We study the data integrity utility
values for different values of Pa and Pdetect ; and plot instantaneous and moving average of data integrity scores. For
calculating the utility values during all the simulations, the parameters are considered as follows: λ = 2, γ = 0.5,
ω = 0.63, and ρ = 0.69.
7.1 Optimistic and Conservative Utility Values Under Same Aack Conditions: Instantaneous and
Average
In Fig. 5, we plot the instantaneous and steady state utility values for both optimistic and conservative models when
the adversary launches attacks with Pa = 0.1 and the system is able to detect aggregated data with Pdetect = 0.9.
The optimistic system is defined with these costs: cc = 0.1, cn = 0.01, and cu = 0.055. The costs for conservative
system are defined as follows: cc = 0.1, cn = 0.01, and cu = 0.09.
We observe that the instantaneous utility values fluctuate over time owing to the particular realizations of Pa in a
time slot and imperfect monitoring based on Pdetect . As expected, with sufficient observations, the moving average
of optimistic utility values converges to a positive steady state value around 0.5. Furthermore, the moving average of
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conservative model utility values converges to a steady state value lower than the corresponding values related to opti-
mistic system. This value is almost zero. Therefore, under the same attack and detection conditions, the collected data
from an optimistic system is usually reliable but the aggregate data from a conservative system is mostly unreliable.
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Fig. 5. Instantaneous and Moving Average utility values of optimistic and conservative systems over time under same aack and
detection conditions: Pa = 0.1 and Pdetect = 0.9
7.2 Utility Value and Aack Magnitude
In Fig. 6, we plot the steady state utility values in an optimistic system for different attack magnitudes, from Pa = 0.1
to Pa = 1, under the same monitoring mechanism, Pdetect = 0.9. In Fig. 7, we illustrate the average utility values
for different attack magnitudes, Pa , under two different monitoring mechanism for both an optimistic system and a
conservative system. Pdetect is 0.9 in Fig. 7(a), and it is 0.5 in Fig. 7(b).
According to Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, aggregate data in an optimistic system with a low Pa is reliable most of the time.
However, if the attack magnitude increases, the collected data becomes mostly unreliable. On the other hand, the
aggregate data in a conservative system is mostly unreliable even with low magnitude of attack. However, with an
increase in magnitude of attack in a conservative system, it becomes more unreliable.
Fig. 7 also reveals that with a reduction in Pdetect , the effect of attack magnitude on utility values follows the same
trend with just a small decrease in utility values. The effect of attackmagnitude on utility value is almost linear. Further-
more, as Pdetect decreases, the difference between average utility values of an optimistic system and a conservative
system increases as cc is same for both systems. The only difference is in cu which is dependent on undecided devices.
7.3 Utility Value and Imperfect Monitoring
Imperfect monitoring can also have negative effect on utility values and subsequently on reliability of collected data
from an IoT system as much as attack magnitude. Fig. 8 shows the effect of imperfect monitoring for an optimistic
system over time while the attack magnitude remains the same, Pa = 0.1. We observe that by an increase in Pdetect ,
the aggregate data become more reliable with a linear trend.
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Fig. 7. Average utility values of optimistic and conservative systems over time vs aack magnitude for different values of Pdetect .
(a) Pdetect = 0.9 , (b) Pdetect = 0.5.
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Fig. 8. Average utility values of an optimistic system over time with increasing Pdetect
7.4 Prospect Theory VS Expected Utility Theory
Expected utility is not as risk averse and loss averse as prospect theory. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 9, it does not
significantly differentiate between optimistic systems and conservative systems.
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Fig. 9. Instantaneous and Moving Average utility values of optimistic and conservative systems over time obtained by prospect
theory and expected utility theory under same aack and detection conditions: Pa = 0.1 and Pdetect = 0.9
We analyzed the effect of expected utility theory on different attack magnitudes in Section 5.4 and predicted the
possible differences between prospect theory and expected utility theory for different attack magnitudes. To validate
those predictions, we have simulated an optimistic system using prospect theory and expected utility theory. The effect
of attack magnitudes on PT and EUT based utility values is shown in Fig. 10. The simulation results perfectly match
with our predictions.
In Section 5.4, we also claimed that the effect of expected utility theory would be different for optimistic and con-
servative systems. Since, expected utility does not use any weight function, large probabilities have a higher effect on
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EUT than PT. Since malicious nodes in conservative systems have a higher cost, this phenomenon is more sensible in
conservative systems. According to Fig. 11, the absolute EUT utility values for conservative systems are much higher
than absolute PT utility values for conservative systems which aligns with our prediction. This effect is to the extent
that even absolute EUT utility values for optimistic systems are larger than absolute PT utility values for conservative
systems.
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Fig. 10. Average utility values of an optimistic system aer 300 iterations obtained by PT and EUT under different aack magnitudes
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Fig. 11. Average utility values of optimistic and conservative systems over time vs aack magnitude obtained by PT and EUT
As discussed, there exists three weight functions associated with probabilities of each outcome which contribute to
the difference between the utility value obtained by EUT and PT. According to Fig. 12, if we consider Pattack = 0.1,
the expected utility value is higher than prospect theory utility value when Pdetect = 1 since Pattack = 0.1 has higher
negative effect on PT than EUT because of value and weight functions. As we decrease the detection accuracy from
Pdetect = 1, utility values obtained by PT and EUT start to decrease. However, this negative effect in PT is more than
EUT until we reach Pdetect = 0.7 (Pundetected ≥ 0.3). As per Fig. 3, for small probabilities (less than 0.3), we consider
higher weights than the actual probabilities in prospect theory. Therefore, it is expected that reduction of Pdetect from
1 to 0.7 which is equivalent to increase of Pundecided from 0 to 0.3 has higher negative effect on the utility obtained
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by prospect theory than expected utility theory. However, according to the weight function, the trend of this effect
will change for larger probabilities (larger than 0.3) which means utility values obtained by EUT should decrease with
higher rate. However, as the detection accuracy decreases, the number of undecided devices increases. According to
Fig. 2, the increase of undecided devices will incur more significant negative effect on PT than EUT. Therefore, as
shown in Fig. 12, for Pdetect ≤ 0.7 (Pundecided ≥ 0.3), these two effects cancel out each other in a fashion that utility
values obtained by EUT and PT decrease with the same rate.
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Fig. 12. Average utility values of an optimistic system over time with increasing Pdetect obtained by PT and EUT
7.5 Defending against On-Off aacks: A special case
We consider an adversary launching On-Off attacks in five stages over 500 time slots. The first 300 slots are an active
attack period and 300-500 is used to study how trust recovers. For most results we consider an Off-On ratio of 2:1. Later
we compare results with 3:1 ratio. We plot the results of On-Off attacks as calculated by the IoT hub using equations
from the asymmetric weighted moving average discussed in Section 6. We compare the results with other popular trust
update schemes and justify the suitability of asymmetric averaging with regard to On-Off attacks.
7.5.1 Choice of weighing factors and threshold. The weighing factors χa , χbmax , χcmin , and χd are chosen as 0.99,
0.999, 0.001 and 0.001. We can verify that this satisfies the conditions: 0 < χcmin << χbmax < 1, 0 < χa < 1, and
0 < χd < 1. The skewed values of the weighing factors χcmin and χbmax justify the asymmetry provided by giving
negative behaviors a very high weightage and positive behavior a very low weightage on the first occurrence of a
negative behavior. The choice of χa and χd can be used to control the rate of trust redemption. If a system requires
slower trust redemption then lower values of χa and χd are necessary. We put these weighing factors in the four case
based equations discussed in Section. 6. Since there is no fixed magnitude of attack we keep the mid point between
the trust value range (−1,+1) as Γon−of f = 0. However, Γon−of f can be adjusted according to the requirements of the
system. More conservative systems will have Γon−of f > 0. Different values of χmin and χmax can be chosen to ensure
more fairness to nodes in a network inherently susceptible to more bit flips due to noise.
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7.5.2 Comparison with Equal Weighted CWMA. In Fig. 13, we show how AWMA performs as opposed to the CWMA.
We observe that at Stage 1 with no attacks, both schemes preserve a high trust value, but when attacks start from the
101-st time slot for the next 50 slots, AWMA ensures that the cumulative dependability score is decreased more rapidly
and preserves a low value. On the other hand, CWMA is slow to react due to the adversary having behaved well in
the first 100 slots. This happens because once the current value in a slot is less than 0, the proposed AWMA model
forgets the previous high reputation through a very low value 1− χbmax = 0.001 and expresses extremely high weight
χbmax = 0.999 to the current values from the 101th time slot, thus causing the cumulative trust at stage 2 to decrease
rapidly. Even at the end of Stage 5, when attacks have ceased for the last 200 slots, we see that the dependability score
given by the asymmetric average is low enough to reflect the adversary’s malicious attacks, while the equal weighted
moving average fails to capture this outcome because the off-on attack ratio is 2 : 1, i.e., more slots with no attacks.
This happens because previous cumulative trust of less than 0 (selected Γonof f ) at the end of Stage 2 is given a very
high weight compared to current honest behavior. It prevents the trust values to improve even during honest behavior.
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Fig. 13. AWMA vs CWMA
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7.5.3 Comparison with Exponential Weighted Moving Average. The major criticism of EWMA was that although it
reacts quickly when attacks start, it also forgets malicious behavior as quickly as it reacts. This is inappropriate because
the system should not be allowed to redeem its trust value quickly unless it experiences a long period of honest behavior.
The key point where a difference is created is Case (c) of the On-Off defense schema where we provide very low value
to honest behavior after a period of dishonest behavior. Hence its cumulative trust value hardly increases. In Fig. 14, we
do not see much difference in Stage 1 due to no attacks. Also there is not much difference in Stage 2 as more weight is
given to new trust values by both models. However, in Stage 3, EWMA allows the malicious device to quickly recover
its trust value owing to forgetting old values. On the other hand, our asymmetric average selectively does not forget
old trust values that are low. This happens because previous cumulative trust of less than 0 (selected Γonof f ) at the
end of Stage 2 is given a very high weight compared to current honest behavior. It prevents improvement of the trust
values even during the period of honest behavior. We see that for all subsequent stages the exponentially weighted
averages oscillate between high and low values, but the asymmetric average preserves a low value while maintaining
fairness by allowing a very slow increase of cumulative trust at stage 5 owing to its continuous good behavior for 200
slots.
7.5.4 Comparison between higher and lower On-Off ratios. A 3:1 Off-On attack ratio is less aggressive than 2:1. Hence,
after 500 slots, we should expect 3:1 to have higher dependability score. It may be noted a ratio as high as 1:1 is not a
characteristic of On-Off attack and too low attack ratio hardly effects the system. In Fig. 15, we observe the differences
in the dependability scores under 2:1 and 3:1 attack ratios.
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ack ratio
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a Bayesian framework to maintain data integrity in an IoT network that is exposed to
opportunistic data manipulation by adversaries. By considering an imperfect monitoring mechanism, we quantified
the trustworthiness of the data being collected by an IoT hub through utility values obtained using prospect theory
and expected utility theory. A comparison was drawn between these two theories considering their features and their
applicability to trust measurements in an IoT network. According to the theoretical predictions and simulation exper-
iments, prospect theory proved to be more promising for measuring trustworthiness of the aggregated data in risk
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averse systems. An asymmetric weighted moving average scheme is also proposed that can counter stealthy On-Off
attacks. The proposed framework has been validated using extensive simulation experiments and the results bring out
the efficacy of the proposed framework.
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